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DECENTRALIZING CRIME CONTROL:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE
Doron Teichman*
INT RODUCTION
In an article recently published on the pages of this Law Review, The
Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional
Competition ("The Market"), 1 I put forward a theory of crime control in a
decentralized government. Specifically, I made three distinct claims. First,
criminal justice policies affect the geographic decision of criminals as to
where to commit their crimes.2 Other things being equal, criminal activity
will tend to shift to areas in which the expected sanction is lower. Second,
local jurisdictions attempting to lower their crime rates will react to policies
adopted

by neighboring jurisdictions and try to keep up with their
neighbors' sanctioning levels.3 In other words, the optimal expected sanction
for a certain jurisdiction cannot be derived from the characteristics of that

jurisdiction alone; it must incorporate the expected sanctions of neighboring
jurisdictions.4 Third, competition among local jurisdictions in the area of
criminal justice could be both efficient (a race to the top) and inefficient (a
race to the bottom) depending on the specific context over which jurisdic5

t10ns are competmg.
•

•

In three insightful comments, Professors Rachel Barkow, Sam Gross,
and Wayne Logan deepen and broaden the discussion I attempted to start in

The Market.6 They

flesh out in great detail some of the theoretical complexi

ties and practical difficulties regarding the competitive forces driving
criminal justice policies that I did not fully treat in

The Market.

Further, they

demonstrate that we should use great caution before adopting any policy
recommendations based on the insights of

The Market.

The comments

*

Assistant Professor, Hebrew University Faculty of Law. B.A. 2000, LL.B. 2000, Tel-Aviv
University; LL.M. 2002, S.J.D. 2004, University of Michigan. -Ed. I would like to thank Rachel
Barkow, Sam Gross, and Wayne Logan for their contributions to this correspondence. For helpful
comments I thank Ronen Avraham, Omri Ben-Shahar, and Ronald Mann.
1.

Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and

Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1831 (2005).

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.
In this regard I parted from the classic economic analysis of crime control as presented in
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
5.

Teichman, supra note 1, at 1858-64.

6.
Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713
(2006); Samuel R. Gross, Jurisdictional Competition in Criminal Justice: How Much Does It Really
Happen?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1725 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and Competitive
Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1733 (2006).

1749

Michigan Law Review

1750

[Vol. 104:1749

clearly help a great deal to understand the issues at hand; one should not
read

The Market

without reading this correspondence.

My goals in this short Reply are twofold. On one hand, I will answer
some of the criticisms leveled against the arguments made in

The Market.

Obviously, due to the constraints of this format, I cannot answer every point
made by the commentators, so I will focus my remarks on the main areas of
disagreement. On the other hand, I will try to build on the comments to ex
tend my initial analysis. The Reply is divided into two parts. In the first, I
shall deal with the existence of competition in the area of criminal justice
and defend my claim that competition affects the design of criminal justice
polices in a decentralized government. In the second, I will tum to the pol
icy implications of my claims and argue that

The Market offers

constructive

policy recommendations for any decentralized criminal justice system, in
cluding the United States.
I. THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM
In

The Market

I argued that competition in the area of criminal justice

could potentially lead to a race to the top or a race to the bottom. The focus
of all three comments published here is on the potential problem-namely,
the race to the bottom. Yet at the outset I would like to point out that in

Market I

spoke of a

The

potential race

to the bottom and emphasized the benefits
of jurisdictional competition in the area of criminal justice. 7 Competition

might drive local governments to innovate and adopt efficient crime control
measures. In addition, decentralization could allow criminal laws to be tai
lored to the sensitive preferences of local communities. Furthermore, there
might be organizational inefficiencies associated with creating large national
agencies that can be avoided by creating small local agencies. Finally, there
might be informational advantages to relying on local rather than national
systems. Thus, while this Reply will focus on the potential race to the bot
tom, the reader should note that that race is only one possible factor to be
weighed in determining crime policy.
The commentators express skepticism as to the existence of competition
with respect to criminal justice. Gross, for example, argues that there might
not even be a question of a race to the top or a race to the bottom for the
8
simple reason that there is no race to begin with. Gross's skepticism arises
from the lack of empirical data supporting the competition hypothesis. This
concern is legitimate, and that is why the claims made in

The Market

were

tentative, pending further empirical research. But Gross does more: he pre
sents data that supposedly suggest that competition does not play an
9
important role in the area of criminal sanctions. Yet a close evaluation dem
onstrates that the data he presents cannot rebut the competition hypothesis.
For instance, Gross points out that between the years 1980 and 2001, while
7.

Teichman, supra note I, at 1858-64.

8.

Gross, supra note 6, at 1732.

9.

Id. at 1730-32.
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prison population rose by a factor of thirteen, the fed
10
According

drug related prison population rose by a factor of sixteen.

to Gross, since the federal government is not part of the jurisdictional race,
the fact that its sanctions rose faster than state sanctions falsifies the compe
11
tition hypothesis. This claim is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, I am
not sure that the federal government is not functioning in a competitive set
ting in the area of drug crimes. Drug crimes in the United States are part of
an international market for drugs, and from that perspective it might be the
case that the United States is attempting to place itself as a country in which
the cost of committing crimes is high. If, for example, the United States
manages to confiscate twice as many drugs as Canada, a drug exporter in
South America might decide to focus his activity on the Canadian market
rather than on the American market. Secondly, and perhaps more impor
tantly, as Barkow clearly described in her reply, the politics of criminal law
1
at the state and federal level are not identical. 2 Thus, simply presenting the
raw numbers (as is done in Gross's response) does not explain the causation
behind the numbers. I do not claim to present a rigorous statistical analysis
here, but it might well be the case that displacement was a driving force at
the state level, while other political forces were active on the federal level.
If, for example, the decision rule of federal legislatures in the area of crimi
nal law is "copy all state legislation and make it a little tougher"-and
Barkow's analysis seems to indicate that that is a distinct possibility-one
would expect to see the exact statistical picture Gross presents. Everything
else

isn't

equal and thus we simply cannot draw the conclusions that Gross
31

would like us to draw from the evidence he presents.

Gross's skepticism as to the competition hypothesis also rests on a rejec
tion of the underlying assumptions as to the behavior of criminals. As he puts
it, ''[i]t's hard to imagine that black crack users from Cleveland have re
sponded to the policy of the Cuyahoga County prosecutor by driving over the
14
Even with

border [and] smoking crack in the nearly all-white suburbs . .. ."

out conducting extensive empirical research one has to concede that this
observation must be true in a large number of cases. Yet as the commentators

10.

Id. at 1731.

11.
Id. Gross also points out that from 1980 through 2001 the total population of prisoners in
state custody increased by about 300% while the population of prisoners in federal custody grew by
630%. Id.
12.

Barkow, supra note 6, at 1720-22.

13.
To some degree, Barkow makes the same mistake that Gross does when she argues that
the fact that the federal government set minimal standards for sex offender registration and notifica
tion leads to the conclusion that there is no race in this context between the states. See id. at 172223. While this fact might demonstrate that the federal government is a poor regulator of the states in
this area due to the political forces active in Congress, it does not demonstrate that competition did
not drive state legislation in the area. Competition might drive state legislation in the area, while
other political forces might drive Congress to enact even tougher laws. The causation is simply
unclear.
14.

Gross, supra note 6, at 1727-28.
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15

likewise, the

possibility that the perception of displacement is driving policies cannot be
1
ruled out. 6 That is an empirical question, and aside from citing anecdotes
1
supporting our positions, not much can be done at this point in time. 7 What
I would like to emphasize here is that at least one competitive force I de
scribed in

The Market requires no assumptions as to the mobility of
18
criminals: the force of competition for capital investments. If criminals are

completely immobile, but capital is mobile and tends to shift to jurisdictions
19
then the competition for capital invest
0
ments will drive the harshening of the criminal justice system.2 To draw on

in which the crime"rate is lower,

Gross's hypothetical, a criminal in Cleveland might not move to Seattle be
cause of a lower expected sanction, but a multinational corporation might
decide to invest in Seattle rather than in Cleveland because of lower crime
rates created by higher expected sanctions.
Finally, Logan also raises doubts as to the validity of the competition
hypothesis due to the large scope of interstate reliance in the area of crimi
nal justice. Logan points out that a sizeable number of jurisdictions (sixteen)
adopted the external approach with respect to the registration requirement of
21
their Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law (SORNL). Logan
notes many negative consequences that arise from the use of the external
approach.22 I am not sure why this evidence is contrary to my assertion. The
fact that so many jurisdictions adopted the external approach

supports

the

competition hypothesis. The very content of those laws demonstrates that
legislatures are concerned about sex offender migration when enacting
SORNLs. In other words, a state cannot design its optimal SORNL without
taking into account the equivalent legislation of other states. That is pre
cisely the positive claim I made in

The Market.

15.

Barkow, supra note 6, at 1723; Gross, supra note 6, at 1725.

16.

Barkow, supra note 6, at 1720.

Measuring crime displacement empirically is an extraordinarily difficult task. The initial
17.
theoretical contribution in the area of geographic displacement caused by crime control efforts was
made in Thomas A. Reppetto, Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon, 22 CRIME &
DELINQ. 166 (1976). Until recently, not a single published study has evaluated displacement di
rectly. Rather, studies dealing with other issues have incidentally reported on displacement. See
David Weisburd et al., Does Crime Just Move Around the Comer?: A Controlled Study of Spatial
Displacement and Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits in Two Crime Hot Spots, 44 CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming Aug. 2006) (reviewing the literature and presenting the first such study).
18.

Teichman, supra note 1, at 1838.

19.
This is not to say that such an assumption is doubt-free. Crime's effects on both real
estate and labor markets could cause places with higher crime rates to actually become attractive for
investors. The reduction of real estate prices brought about by higher crime rates could lower costs
for investors. In addition, higher crime rates might indicate the presence of a large labor force will
ing to work for relatively low wages.
20.
(1997).

See Nicolas Marceau, Competition in Crime Deterrence, 30 CAN. J. EcoN. 844, 851-53

21.

Logan, supra note 6, at 1736.

22.

Id. at 1737-45.
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While I disagree with the comments' denial of the very existence of
competition, the comments nonetheless help flesh out some of the nuances
of competition in criminal justice that I did not pay full attention to in

The

Gross, for example, points out that interjurisdictional differences
can arise out of the way prosecutorial discretion is applied.23 Given the fact

Market.

that in the United States prosecutors hold tremendous discretion and power
over the sanctioning process, it could very well be the case that a significant
part of the effect of jurisdictional competition occurs in that area. To illus
trate, think of the choice faced by a prosecutor who--due to a budget
constraint-can only prosecute one of two criminals who committed identi
cal crimes. The first is a local teenager, and the second is a teenager from
the neighboring poor suburb. Suppose that there exists a relatively large pool
of potential criminals who might come into the jurisdiction to commit their
crimes from the poor suburb, while crimes committed by locals are rare
events. The prosecutor might choose to invest his limited resources in prose
cuting the out-of-town criminal in order to send a message to criminals in
neighboring jurisdictions that they should take their business elsewhere.
The comments also help one understand how legislative competition is
triggered. As Gross and Barkow point out, displacement was only an unin
tended consequence of California's three-strikes law.24 Barkow continues by
outlining the alternative political forces that drive the enactment of new
5
criminal legislation.2 I completely agree with this analysis. As the evidence
cited in

The Market shows, California did not anticipate the displacement
effect of its three-strikes legislation prior to enacting it.26 This was probably
also the case with respect to other examples I analyzed in

The Market,

such

as SORNLs and laws limiting the sale of pseudoephedrine. The original
pieces of legislation-enacted in New Jersey and Oklahoma, respectively
probably had little to do with an intentional crime displacement plan and
much more to do with the public outcry caused by two especially heinous
crimes.2 7 Nonetheless, an interesting question remains: what do such "legis
lative shocks" cause once they are enacted? In many cases, innovation stems
from unintended consequences. A drug manufacturer developing a drug
aimed at treating cardiac diseases might unintentionally develop a drug that

23.

Gross, supra note 6, at 1727.

24.

Id. at 1730; see Barkow, supra note 6, at 1716-18.

25.

Barkow, supra note, 6 at 1718.

26.

Teichman, supra note 1, at 1847.

27.

New Jersey enacted its SORNL after the brutal rape and murder of Megan Kanka by a
neighbor who was a convicted sex offender. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir.
1997) (describing how SORNLs spread to forty-nine states following the murder). Oklahoma en
acted a law limiting the sale of pseudoephedrine, a key ingredient in the production of the drug
methamphetamine, after a state trooper was murdered by someone under the influence of the drug.
See Matthew Hathaway, Authorities Here Push Plan to Fight Meth by Curbing Sale of Cold Pills,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 2004, at A I.
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28
treats erectile disorders. This new (unintended) drug will be produced by
that manufacturer and copied by other manufacturers, just like any drug that
was created intentionally. Similarly,

while

California might not have

adopted its three-strikes law in order to displace crime, its continued (costly)
application in California, and its dissemination to other states, can be ex
plained by its unintended consequence. Furthermore, to the extent that this
dynamic process-heinous crime followed by public outcry, legal reform in
one state, displacement, and legal reform in neighboring states-is driving
criminal legislation, it implies that a long-term steady equilibrium might not
be a feasible option in the market for criminal justice. Heinous crimes that
shock the public are as sure a thing as death and taxes. Thus, the system will
find it difficult to stabilize in a long-term equilibrium.
Barkow, in her comment, helps flesh out yet another complexity of com
petition in criminal justice. As she notes, governments generally wish to
9
maintain an internally rational criminal code.2 Thus, even if theft were totally
displaceable, and murder

were completely undispalceable, governments

would still maintain a higher sanction for murder since the criminal code re
flects a type of moral menu of a community. I agree with this claim, yet I do
not necessarily agree with Barkow's conclusion that the effect of competition
on raising sanctions is limited since the set of displaceable crimes is very
small. The rational menu argument cuts both ways because the need to
maintain internal rationality might cause a trickling effect from displaceable
crimes into the entire criminal code. In this process, sanctions for displace
able crimes might rise because of competitive pressures, and then the rest of
the code might adjust upwards in order to sustain internal rationality. Thus,
we will observe an escalation in criminal sanctions in general, not only in
0
those that deal with displaceable crimes.3
A final point, which may be a tangential step from the comments, has to
do with the deeper social meaning of jurisdictional competition. Gross
opens his comment by citing stories from Huckleberry Finn and Unforgiven
1
about driving the bad guy out of town.3 These anecdotal stories might re
flect the role that jurisdictional competition and crime displacement play in
structuring the way people think and feel about crime control. People might
not consciously think in terms of displacing crime, but after so many books,
movies, and plays describe crime displacement as a solution to crime prob
lems, they might simply perceive crime as something that needs to be
displaced. If this is the case, displacement could very well be yet another

28.
Consider the story behind the development of the blockbuster drug Viagra. See Dennis
Fernandez & Mary Chow, Intellectual Property Strategy in Bioinformatics and Biochips, 85 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 465, 468 (2003).
29.

Barkow, supra note 6, at 1721.

The possibility mentioned in the text is rather bad news for empirical studies aimed at
30.
testing the competition hypothesis. One plausible empirical test would be to compare trends in sanc
tions in displaceable and undisplaceable crimes over time. To the extent that the sanctions for
displaceable crimes tend to rise faster, that would support the competition hypothesis. Yet since the
two variables might be connected, designing such a test might be difficult.
3 1.

Gross, supra note 6, at 1725.
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elephant hiding in the room of American criminal justice. Notice that this
also leads to the conclusion that the effects of displacement might be well
beyond displaceable crimes. A jurisdiction might adopt a harsh three-strikes
law in order to send a general message to the public: "don't mess with our
jurisdiction." This would be an especially likely strategy with high-profile
legislation that tends to focus public attention. As Barkow points out, sym
bolism plays an important role in the structuring of American criminal law.32
But the question remains: what exactly are jurisdictions symbolizing when
they enact tough criminal laws?
In sum, the competition hypothesis comes out of this correspondence
alive and even strengthened. In a decentralized government, jurisdictions
take into account the policies of neighboring jurisdictions when designing
key elements of their criminal justice system. Yet as the short discussion
demonstrates, this competition involves different social forces, and there is
much more work to be done before we fully understand it.
II. THE SOLUTIONS
So there's a race, and it might even be to the bottom; but what (if any
thing) do we do about it? One possible solution I suggested in

The Market

was the use of central planners that will regulate the behavior of local play
ers by, say, setting maximal sanctions for local jurisdictions.33 This implies
that in the American setting additional federal regulation in the area of crime
control might be desirable.34 The commentators oppose this conclusion and
argue that federal involvement in the area is undesirable.35 Before turning to
deal with the replies in detail, I would like to make two preliminary com
ments. First, as I noted in

The Market,

additional federal regulation is

desirable only if this regulation will fulfill the role of a rational central plan
ner. The few examples I analyzed in

The Market showed that Congress is
currently not acting in such a fashion.36 The commentators took this issue a
step further and demonstrated convincingly that the federal government
cannot currently be expected to act as a rational central planner. Given this, I

have no problem conceding that at this point "the United States criminal
justice system has little to gain, and perhaps even much to lose, from addi
tional federal regulation."3 7
Second, since the focus of the discussion here is on the American federal
state debate, I would like to situate this debate in its appropriate place

32.

Barkow, supra note 6, at 1718.

33.

Teichman, supra note I, at 1866-74.

34.
Id. This does not imply that only federal involvement is desirable. Additional state regu
lation of the activities of local Jaw enforcement agencies may be useful as well.
35.
Barkow, supra note 6, at 1720-23; Gross, supra note 6, at 173 1-32; Logan, supra note 6,
at 1745-47.
36.
Teichman, supra note I, at 1870-73 (evaluating federal legislation in the area of criminal
justice in a critical fashion).
37.

Id. at 1874.
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is not a paper about the relationship be

tween the federal and state governments in the United States in the context
of criminal justice. Rather, my analysis of the specific relationship between
the state and federal governments in the United States with respect to crimi
nal justice aimed to serve as a mere illustration of a broad theoretical
framework.

The Market

offers a way to think about any policy adopted by

any level of a decentralized government in order to control crime. Issues
such as the intrastate relationship between counties and the state govern
ment, the size of sanctions nations adopt with respect to crimes that can
travel across international lines, immigration policies regarding potential
felons, and the harmonization of criminal law in Europe as that unification
process progresses, all fall under the framework of

The Market.

In the

American context, as Gross points out, it might be the case that the interest
ing questions regarding crime displacement and the law lie in the intrastate
8
domain between cities and counties, and not in the interstate domain.3
Having made these preliminary comments, I would like to address sev
eral of the policy issues raised by the commentators and use this opportunity
to clarify and extend some of the arguments I made in

The Market.

Barkow

focuses her critique on the unique pathologies of the politics of American
criminal justice. These pathologies, she argues, render the federal govern
ment a poor central planer. For the most part I find myself in complete
agreement with Barkow. Yet her analysis does raise several side issues. First,
while the institutional analysis she presents is important, a substantive the
ory of the goals of legislation is important as well.

The Market

offers

policymakers a clear benchmark in order to evaluate crime control legisla
tion enacted by Congress. For instance, it allows the critic to explain
precisely what is wrong with federal legislation that imposes harsh minimal
9
standards on states.3 Second, a specific subset of policymakers that could
find the ideas of

The Market

useful in making decisions are federal judges.

As Barkow and I agree, the federal courts could serve a useful role in curb
40
ing the trend of increasing harshness in American criminal justice.
Understanding the role of the federal government as a central planner of
crime control can assist federal judges in interpreting legal terms such as
"cruel and unusual punishment" and "legitimate state interest." Finally,
Barkow's analysis is extremely useful in the sense that it is pragmatic and
takes the American criminal justice system as it is, yet in that sense it is also
path dependent and does not deal with the issue of how an ideal system
should look. For instance, Barkow points out that the fact that the federal
government is responsible for prosecuting only a small subset of criminals

38.

Gross, supra note 6, at 1727.

See, e.g., Megan's Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Chil
39.
dren and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 572 (Jan. 5,
1999) (noting that "[t]he Wettlerling [sic] Act generally sets out minimum standards for state sex
offender registration programs").
40.

Barkow, supra note 6, at 1723 n.46.
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41
allows it to use the high sanctioning level it does. But if we do not take that
as a given and ask ourselves how an optimal criminal justice system should
be structured, we might conclude that crime control (or certain aspects of it)
should be completely federalized. In that case, the federal government might
adopt lower sanctions since it simply could not afford its current sanctioning
level.
Logan continues the line of thought developed by Barkow and points out
that, as a practical matter, even a well-intentioned federal government will
2
find it difficult to regulate competition in criminal justice.4 This is clearly a
valid point. The regulation of actors who are competing among themselves
is a difficult, at times even impossible, task. Once one dimension of compe
tition is regulated, the parties find nonregulated avenues to compete over.
Even in a relatively centralized government, regulating local players could
prove to be a tricky task. In Israel, for instance, crime control is managed by
4
the national government. 3 This causes local municipalities to shift their
crime displacement efforts to other avenues. The city of Tel Aviv recently
invested substantial amounts of money in renovating and illuminating a park
that became a magnet for drug dealers as a result of crime control efforts in
44
a neighboring suburb. This, in turn, caused the activity to shift from the
45
park to neighboring areas. Other Israeli municipalities have overcome the
lack of a locally controlled police force by hiring private security companies
46
that provide them with semi-police services. Nonetheless, some forms of
regulation can be easy to manage. For instance, in the area of SORNLs, the
federal government could set the maximum duration of public notification
4
allowed. 7 This is a clear, bright-line rule that the states will find difficult to
circumvent. The duration of the registration requirement is of importance
since, as I pointed out elsewhere, indefinite registration might create a prob
48
to say nothing of

lem of marginal deterrence with respect to sex offenders,

protecting other values such as forgiveness and rehabilitation. States might

41.
Id. at 1722. In this regard, Barkow also raises the concern that this might cause the fed
eral government to adopt a strategy of high sanctions coupled with a low probability of detection.
Unlike Barkow, I am not sure that that is such a bad outcome. See Becker, supra note 4, at 184
(pointing out the efficiency of raising sanctions while lowering the probability of detection).
42.

Logan, supra note 6, at 1746.

See David Weisburd, Orit Shalev & Menachem Amir, Community Policing in Israel:
Resistance and Change, 25 POLICING 80, 82 (2002) (describing the structure of the national Israeli

43.

police force).
44.
Yu val Azulay, Tel Aviv Launches 'Green' Plan to Combat Inner City Drug-Addict
Colonies, HAARETZ, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/

PrintArticleEn.jhtml ?itemNo=58462 I.
45.

Id.

The affluent suburb Kefar Shmariahu adopted such a policy. See http://www.kfar.org.il/
46.
(describing the suburb's security program).
47.
This is contrary to the current situation in which federal legislation sets out minimal
registration requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(8) (2000) (requiring lifetime registration
only for certain types of offenders).
48.
Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan's Laws,
42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 389-91 (2005).
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not be able to protect such interests and values because of the risk of sex
offender migration from states with long (at times indefinite) registration
requirements to states with shorter registration requirements.
Logan focuses his critique on the reliance of states on the outcomes of
criminal procedures in other states, what he terms as the external approach.
In

The Market,

I endorsed the external approach as a viable way for states to

shed themselves from unwanted migration triggered by other states' harsh
49
criminal laws. While Logan raises some interesting concerns as to the use
of the external approach, these concerns do not undermine the case for its
use as a tool to overcome some of the collective action problems identified
in

The Market. A central part of Logan's critique of the external approach is
50
his concern that it will lead to what he sees as unfair outcomes. As he
points out, an immigrant from a state with harsh registration requirements

such as South Carolina might have to register as a sex offender in a state that
51
adopted the external approach (say Michigan ) in cases in which a resident
of Michigan who committed an identical crime does not have to register. Yet
Logan's conclusion that unequal treatment necessarily implies unfairness is
tenuous since he employs a strictly ex post view of fairness. He implicitly
assumes that if Michigan did not adopt the external approach everyone
would be treated equally, and the immigrant from South Carolina would not
have to register as a sex offender in Michigan. However, once we shift to the
ex ante point of view, this result does not necessarily hold. Facing sex of
fender migration from South Carolina due to the harsh legal conditions
there, Michigan might be compelled to duplicate those conditions in order to
cut down unwanted migration. Thus, both the immigrant from South Caro
lina and the native resident of Michigan will have to register. True, Logan's
world is fair in the sense that everyone is treated equally; but everyone is
treated more harshly in his world as well. This raises the question: what's so
fair about fairness?
Once the ex ante view is adopted, additional problems in Logan's com
ments emerge. For instance, he argues that adopting the external approach
will bring about more uniformity in the area of SORNLs, which will un
52
dermine legal experimentation in the area. The effect of the external
approach, however, is the exact opposite. The external approach allows for
more legislative diversity, since states adopting it will be free to legislate
more lenient SORNLs without being concerned about opportunistic immi
gration of sex offenders. Not using the external approach, on the other hand,
will bring about uniformity in the area since states will simply converge to
5
the harshest possible standards. 3 Following the argument presented above,

49.

Teichman, supra note I, at 1872-73.

50.

Logan, supra note 6, at 1739-41.

51.

See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.723(1)(d) (West 2004).

52.

Logan, supra note 6, at 1742-44.

53. Logan is also concerned that the external approach will make it difficult to measure the
efficiency of different policies since the control set will be eliminated. Id. at 1744. Actually, the
external approach offers many opportunities for those engaged in empirical studies. Rather than
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the fact that Michigan adopted the external approach allows it to adopt a
SORNL that is different (and more lenient) than that of South Carolina.
Logan's concern over the limitation of the freedom of movement caused
54
by the external approach seems problematic as well. The external approach
does not penalize an offender for migrating to another state; it simply sus
tains the same legal regime that he was subject to in his initial place of
residence. Hence, if an offender wishes to migrate from South Carolina to
Michigan because of a lucrative job offer, the fact that his registration re
quirement will follow him only means that he will be indifferent in his
residence decision from that perspective. If there is social capital to be
gained from migration, the individual will still migrate.
Logan continues and raises two intriguing concerns over the effect of the
external approach on the states' democratic process. Logan argues that the
external approach allows states to codify harsh legislation from other states
55
without a transparent political process. As he put it "[t]he external ap
5
proach thus permits a kind of stealth legislation." 6 This concern seems
slightly overstated for two reasons. First, it again ignores the ex ante per
spective that led to the conclusion that the external approach will generally
allow for more lenient laws. Thus, while the external approach might se
cretly import to Michigan harsh requirements that will apply to individuals
migrating to the state, it will also allow for more leniency towards Michigan
residents. Second, it overlooks the fact that the external approach by defini
tion applies only to individuals immigrating to the state, which is a rather
small subset of individuals. Between 1995 and 2000 the interstate migration
57
rate was 86.7 per 1,000 residents. Thus, this does not seem to be a practical
way to harshen a state's entire criminal code, and one should not exaggerate
the concerns arising from it.
Logan further claims that the external approach is unwarranted since it
forsakes "the right of states to act autonomously and independently, free of
58
the constraining authority of other governmental units." This claim over
looks the fact that even without any federal constraints, states act under a
different, and at times much more ruthless, constraint: the constraint of the
market. When actors operate within a competitive setting, their choices
might be constrained such that they reflect the structure of the setting and
59
not their individual choices. The Market demonstrates that state legislation
comparing two sets of criminals in different states with different legal regimes, the external ap
proach will create within the state two sets of criminals that are subject to different legal regimes.
Measuring the differences between these two groups will isolate the effect of the legal policy from
differences attributable to social differences between states.
54.

Id. at 1743.

55.

Id. at 1741-42.

56.

Id. at 1742.

57.
RACHELS. FRANKLIN, DOMESTIC MIGRATION ACROSS REGIONS, DIVISIONS, ANDSTATES:
1995 TO 2000, at 3 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-7.pdf.
58.

Logan, supra note 6, at 1742.

See generally Debra Satz & John Ferejohn, Rational Choice and Social Theory, 91 J.
59.
PHIL. 71 (1994).
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and policies in the area of criminal justice do not necessarily reflect the
ideal decisions for the state. Rather, they reflect the ideal decisions given the
competitive pressures arising from other states. I personally, like others writ
ing from a rational choice perspective, am not inclined to make a fetish of
60
federalism. At the end of the day the question is an instrumental one. States
should not have a "right" to engage in harmful competition, and the federal
government should not be precluded from regulating certain types of state
61
behavior merely because it did not do so before.
The gap between what states do and what states want to do in the area of
criminal legislation has doctrinal implications regarding the tendency of
courts to use comparative legal analysis with respect to criminal law. Courts
evaluating

the

constitutionality

of

criminal

sanctions

against

Eighth

Amendment challenges routinely engage in a practice of comparative legal
analysis. According to this analysis, if a large group of states follows a cer
tain sanctioning practice, then one can deduce that the practice should be
6
upheld because there does not exist a national consensus against it. 2 The
implicit assumption in this type of analysis is that one can reach normative
conclusions from the positive picture one sees. But with jurisdictional com
petition in the picture, such a connection does not necessarily exist since in
a competitive setting jurisdictions might be compelled to adopt harsh poli
6
cies that are far from ideal. 3
In conclusion, while the policy discussion in this correspondence natu
rally focuses the attention on the disagreements between my colleagues and
me, one should take notice of the range of agreement between us as well.
For the most part, the discussion reflects a methodological consensus as to
the way the questions raised in

The Market

should be addressed. Namely,

we agree that the desired structure of the criminal justice system should be
analyzed through the lens of the political economy of the different govern
mental institutions composing it.

60.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 281 (2d ed. 2001). See generally Ed
ward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 903 (1994) (presenting an instrumental analysis of federalism).
61.
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 60, at 951 (noting that "[w]hen some branch of the national
government decides to act in a way that displaces state authority, there is no basis for restricting
such action").
62.
See, e. g. , Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S . 302, 333-35 (1989) (upholding the death penalty
for the mentally retarded);Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (upholding the death
penalty for individuals who committed their crimes as juveniles); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
154 (1987) (upholding Arizona's death penalty for felony murder). Stanford and Penry were later
abrogated due to a trend among states to eliminate those forms of sanctioning. See Roper v. Sim
mons, 543 U.S . 551, 564-68 (2005) (striking down the death penalty for juveniles); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002) (striking down the death penalty for the mentally retarded).
The trends documented in these two cases stand in opposition to the claim of a general harshening
in American criminal justice.
63.

Note the difference between the argument 1 make here and the argument

I made in

The

Market on the issue of comparative analysis, Teichman, supra note I, at 1869-70. In The Market, I
argued that a comparative analysis of sanctions might be useful in order to strike down dispropor

tionately high sanctions. The point I make in the text above is that such analysis should not be made
in order to uphold a general practice of harsh sanctions.
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CONCLUSION

The Market
tem

ended with a question: is the American criminal justice sys

engaged in a race to

the top or

a

race

to the bottom? This

correspondence demonstrates that answering this question might be a thorny
task. Criminal law is a complex social phenomenon involving competing,
and at times contradicting, values. It is difficult to understand, particularly in
an intricate system such as the American one. Professors Rachel Barkow,
Sam Gross, and Wayne Logan, each from her or his unique perspective,
helped us all understand some of these difficulties. Furthermore, at the end
of this correspondence, one can map out several avenues to continue and
explore the issues raised here.
One avenue of research could explore plausible connections between
mobility and criminal sanctions from a quantitative perspective. As mobility
becomes easier, the competitive forces identified in

The Market

will be

stronger, and jurisdictions will be expected to adjust their policies faster.
This hypothesis could be explored by comparing jurisdictions that are rela
tively isolated, such as Hawaii and Alaska, with jurisdictions in which the
costs of moving are lower. Testing the mobility hypothesis could also focus
on how the lifting of legal travel restrictions affects the level of criminal
sanctioning. Notice that as a theoretical matter it is difficult to predict the
precise effect of such changes, and one must distinguish between short-term
and long-term changes in the level of sanctions. While in the long run, com
petition generated by a decentralized criminal justice system is expected to
drive sanctions upward, the short-term effect of decentralization might actu
ally be the

reduction of sanctions by some local jurisdictions.

If at the initial

point the units operated in isolation (think of Europe for example), then
once travel restrictions are lifted and criminals are free to cross borders, the
units with higher sanctions might see an immediate reduction in their crime
rates, since local criminals will travel to the more lenient jurisdictions. This,
in tum, will allow the harsher jurisdictions to lower their sanctions (while
the lenient jurisdictions will face higher crime rates and raise their sanc
tions). Nonetheless, after the initial reduction, long term competition will
still drive all jurisdictions to raise sanctions. As is evident from this point,
the precise hypothesis generated by

The Market

could be rich and complex,

depending on the unique circumstances of each situation.
More qualitative work could also further our understanding of the issues at
hand. Closely examining the selection of cases made by prosecutors might
shed light on the role of displacement in applying prosecutorial discretion.
Specific case studies of criminal legislation could flesh out the political forces
driving the enactment of new criminal legislation. Note, for example, that the
Texas legislation aimed against the sale of pseudoephedrine was initiated by a
64
state senator representing a county bordering Oklahoma. To the extent that
this is a common phenomenon, such studies could help us understand the

64.
Under the Dome, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 11, 2005, at SA (reporting on a bill
introduced bySenator Estes from Wichita Falls, Texas).
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politics of criminal legislation. By using methodological tools-including
interviews, media surveys, and close examinations of legislative history
they might help explain some of the complicated causation issues that quan
titative studies cannot fully address.

